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History Repeats Itself in the
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When Abraham Israel McCord was fatally shot by a prison
guard on May 15, 1996, while working on a chain gang near Mont-
gomery, Alabama, he unexpectedly earned a place in history by
changing the direction of American prison management.1 After
being de-shackled to board a prisoner bus, McCord attacked an-
other prisoner with a bush ax, prompting a guard to shoot McCord
to protect the other prisoner.2 Partly because of this incident, the
state of Alabama reformed its year-old use of prisoner chain gangs,
abandoning the practice of chaining five inmates to each other for
work duty.3
McCord's death prompted a settlement 4 between Alabama
prison officials, Alabama's governor and attorneys representing
* J.D. expected 1997, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. 1992, Ham-
line University. I gratefully acknowledge Rhonda Brownstein of the Southern
Poverty Law Center for her willingness to share information; University of Minne-
sota Law School Professor Michael Tonry for his comments on an earlier draft of
this article; Ben Weiss, John Lacey and Scott Ihrig for their thoughtful editing;
Mynda Grimaldi Ohman for her eye for detail; Duke Elvis for staying awake with
me those late nights; and finally, my husband, Don Trombley, for his amazing pa-
tience and support.
1. See State Changes Restraints for Chain Gang Inmates, MONTGOMERY AD-
VERTISER, May 25, 1996, at 3F. For the purposes of this Article, "chain gang" de-
scribes the practice of chaining inmates together in groups.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Alabama prison officials quit chaining inmates to each other six days after
the shooting, and parties reached a settlement just one month after McCord was
shot. Id.; Alabana Agrees to Abolish Chain Gang Shackles, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, June 21, 1996, at 1A. Although other factors led up to the settlement
(see infra Part I.C.), McCord's death appeared to be the final impetus. See Ala-
bana Agrees to Abolish Chain Gang Shackles, supra, at 1A; Alabama Backtracks
on Its Chain Gangs, TAMPA TRIB., June 21, 1996, at 1; Settlement Will Ban Ala-
bama's Prison Chain Gangs, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1996, at A14.
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prisoners in an extant class-action suit which alleged that chain
gangs constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 6 The
settlement bans Alabama from chaining prisoners to each other
but allows prisoners to be individually shackled.7 Seen as a re-
5. Alabama prisoners filed a class-action lawsuit in May 1995 against Gover-
nor Fob James and then-Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections
Ron Jones alleging that chain gangs violate their constitutional rights. Second
Am. Compl. at 1-2, Austin v. James, No. 95-T-637-N (D. Ala. filed May 15, 1995)
[hereinafter Complaint]. The prisoners' complaint focused heavily on the risks
imposed on chain gangs, as well as asserting that chain gangs violate the right to
be treated with fundamental human dignity. Id. at 4-9. These claims are ex-
panded in Part III.
Prisoners claim several further conditions are unconstitutional: (1) the prac-
ticing of handcuffing inmates to a "hitching post" if they refuse to work; (2) unsani-
tary toilet facilities and (3) the denial of visitation imposed on chain gang inmates.
Alabama Agrees to Abolish Chain Gang Shackles, supra note 4, at 1A. See also
Complaint, supra, at 4; Telephone Interview with Rhonda Brownstein, Attorney,
Southern Poverty Law Center (Sept. 12, 1996). The Southern Poverty Law Center
in Montgomery, Alabama, represented the prisoners in this action. Id. Trial is set
for October 1996 for the remaining claims in the lawsuit. Id.
For a discussion of the lawsuit, see Alabama Backtracks on Its Chain Gangs,
supra note 4, at 1. See also Alabama Agrees to Abolish Chain Gang Shackles, su-
pra note 4, at 1A, Chain Gangs are Halted in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1996,
at A14; Settlement Will Ban Alabama's Prison Chain Gangs, supra note 4, at A14.
6. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
7. Alabama Backtracks on Its Chain Gangs, supra note 4, at 1. Prior to May
21, 1996, an Alabama chain gang prisoner had a shackle around each ankle, with
eight feet of chain connecting each ankle to another prisoner's ankle. John Leland
& Vern E. Smith, Back on the Chain Gang, NEWSWEEK, May 15, 1995, at 58, 58;
Mark Schone, Alabama Bound, SPIN, Oct. 1995, at 76, 78. Five prisoners were
connected to each other for ten-hour workdays. Complaint, supra note 5, at 4. But
see Leland & Smith, supra, at 58 (reporting that chain gang prisoners worked
twelve-hour days). Pursuant to the settlement, prisoners can still be forced to
work in chains, but they will not be chained to each other in groups of five. State
Changes Restraints for Chain Gang Inmates, supra note 1, at 3F. Instead, an indi-
vidual prisoner's ankles will be connected by a chain. Id.
The distinction between chaining inmates together in groups and individually
shackling them is important because the bulk of the constitutionality argument
relies on the risk involved when inmates are chained to one another. The risks a
prisoner may encounter from the elements or his chain-mates are magnified when
he is chained to four other inmates. See Schone, supra, at 78. The Alabama De-
partment of Corrections admits that chaining prisoners together results in
"marginal safety." Stipulation at 1, Austin v. James, No. 95-T-637-N (D. Ala. fied
May 15, 1995) [hereinafter Stipulation]. The settlement reached by Alabama offi-
cials and attorneys for Alabama prisoners states, in part:
mhe Department of Corrections ... believes that the latter practice [of
individually chaining inmates] allows more productive and efficient man-
agement of inmates, with increased safety and security... . [Tihe Defen-
dant Commissioner of the Department of Corrections knows of no reason
to resume the practice of chaining inmates together because of its inher-
ent inefficiency and marginal safety.
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treat by Alabama prison officials from their purported get-tough-
on-crime policies, the settlement represented a marked departure
from the enthusiasm that accompanied the re-introduction of pris-
oner chain gangs in May 1995.8
This Article argues that prisoner chain gangs, intended to
appease a crime-weary public, are not only a simplistic solution to
complex penal problems, but are also unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Chain
gangs are constitutionally infirm because of the risk they pose to
prisoners, the intent behind the use of chain gangs and the depri-
vation of fundamental human dignity that accompanies being
chained to other prisoners. 9
Since the parties involved in the Alabama lawsuit reached a
pre-trial settlement,10 the constitutional questions raised by Ala-
bama prisoners remain unanswered. The purpose of this Article is
to provide potential plaintiffs seeking to challenge the constitu-
tionality of chain gangs with an arsenal of arguments against the
practice. Part I of this Article documents Alabama's year-long ex-
perience with prisoner chain gangs, examining why the experi-
ment failed. Part I then examines other areas of the country,
where, despite Alabama's experience, prisoners are still at risk of
being placed on chain gangs. Part II provides an overview of per-
tinent Eighth Amendment precedent. Part III contends that
chaining prisoners together is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment and further analyzes how a
chain gang prisoner could use specific characteristics unique to
chain gangs to argue that chain gangs are unconstitutional.
I. The Alabama Chain Gang Experiment
A. History of Chain Gangs
The chain gang was first integrated into the prison system in
the United States shortly after the Civil War." Many of the pris-
Id. (emphasis added).
8. See generally Alabama Prison Commissioner Says Inmates Enjoying Prison
Too Much, JET, Apr. 10, 1995, at 37 (describing Jones' planned revival of chain
gangs); Leland & Smith, supra note 7, at 58 (reporting on the six weeks of practice
runs and first week of official chain gang work in Alabama-the first state since
the 1960s to return to the use of shackles).
9. Complaint, supra note 5, at 1.
10. Stipulation, supra note 7 at 1.




ons in the South were destroyed during the Civil War. 12 Chaining
prisoners together to complete much-needed work assignments
was an immediate and inexpensive alternative to rebuilding pris-
ons. 13 During Reconstruction, Southern states commonly used
prisoners on road construction and other rebuilding efforts.' 4 In
addition, chains provided an easy means of preventing escape. 15
These prisoners, who were almost exclusively African Ameri-
can, suffered the tensions of Reconstruction as well as mercilessly
long sentences and laws designed to criminalize unemployment. 6
Northern states, without slavery to influence penological direction,
were instead influenced by concepts of religion and education. 17
These influences prevented the introduction of chain gangs to the
Northern states.'8
Chain gangs were deadly for prisoners. There was no master
to protect the lives of his labor force, and without such paternalis-
tic protection, l9 chain gang prisoners died at alarming rates. 20 Life
on a chain gang was brutal:
Convicts labored, ate, and slept with chains riveted around
their ankles. Work was done "under the gun" from sun-up to
sundown, shoveling dirt at fourteen shovelfuls a minute. Food
was bug-infested, rotten and unvarying; "rest" was taken in
unwashed bedding, often in wheeled cages nine feet wide by
twenty feet long containing eighteen beds. Medical treatment
and bathing facilities were unsanitary, if available at all.
And, above all, corporal punishment and outright tor-
ture--casual blows from rifle butts or clubs, whipping with a
leather strap, confinement in a "sweat-box" under the south-
ern sun, and hanging from stocks or bars--was meted out for
the most insignificant transgressions, particularly to African-
Americans who remained the majority of chain gang prison-
ers.
2 1
12. Id. at 198-99.
13. See id. (explaining how political leaders sought to cut the tax burden and to
rebuild railroads).
14. Id. at 211.
15. Id. at 210, 212-13.
16. See id. at 198, 210-11.
17. Id. at 207.
18. See id. (contrasting Northern ideas with Southern traditions of slavery and
penology).
19. Id. at 207-08.
20. Id. at 210. In the 1880s, the average death rate of twenty-eight Northern
prisons was 14.9 per thousand, while the corresponding rate in the South was 41.3
per thousand. Id. at 209-10.
21. ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH 183 (1996) (citing FRANK
TANNENBAUM, DARKER PHASES OF THE SOUTH 73-113 (1924); JOHN SPIVAK, On the
Chain Gang, INTERNATIONAL PAMPHLETS No. 32 (1932); ARTHUR RAPER, PREFACE
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Chain gangs survived in one form or another until the 1960s,
when they finally succumbed to economic forces and negative pub-
lic pressure. 22 At least one chain gang critic, Alex Lichtenstein,
has argued that the demise of chain gangs was prompted primarily
by economic reasons.
Despite the scandal generated by I am a Fugitive [movie de-
picting horrors of southern chain gangs], the southern convict
road gang, like its predecessor the convict-lease, eventually
began to succumb to economic and social forces which rede-
fined the place of penal labor in the South's political economy,
rather than to the renewed clamor for humanitarian penal re-
form.23
Lichtenstein further explains that pressure to end chain gangs be-
gan during the Great Depression when the unemployed sought
jobs that were being performed by prisoners. 24
Widespread penal reform in the 1950s and 1960s also con-
tributed to the abandonment of chain gangs. A series of prison ri-
ots across the country in the 1950s led authorities to examine
methods of incarceration and to experiment with new types of
classification and treatment of prisoners. 25 One commentator,
Blake McKelvey, examined the shortcomings of both "progressive
and backward" states' prison management practices that led to the
self-evaluation and campaign to win public support for successful
prison programs. 26 Although McKelvey does not assert that chain
gangs were abandoned in the 1960s as a result of prison riots and
subsequent reforms, it is likely that widespread penal reform con-
tributed to their demise.27
B. A Tale of Two Politicians: Chain Gangs Return to
Alabama
Not surprisingly, Alabama officials treated the reappearance
of chain gangs as an original idea rather than a return to the
TO PEASANTRY: A TALE OF TWO BLACK BELT COUNTIES 294-96 (1936); BAYARD
RUSTIN, Twenty-Two Days on a Chain Gang, in DOWN THE LINE: THE COLLECTED
WRITINGS OF BAYARD RUSTIN 26-49 (1971)).
22. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 21, at 190-91. Also see Schone, supra note 7, at
82 ("By the mid-60's, chains were scrap metal throughout the South. Shackles
joined 'WHITES ONLY' as dimly remembered relics of apartheid.").
23. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 21, at 190.
24. Id.
25. Cf. MCKELVEY, supra note 11, at 322-36 (arguing that riots in the 1950s
forced prison officials and the American Prison Association to move forward with
prison reforms).
26. Id. at 322.
27. See supra note 25.
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slave-like approach of the original chain gangs. 28 As one newspa-
per article pointed out, "No one at the state Corrections Depart-
ment can recall when Alabama did away with chain gangs or
why."
2 9
The decision to reinstate chain gangs in Alabama was made
on the campaign trail.3 0 Ron Jones, a prison warden, recom-
mended the step to Republican gubernatorial candidate Forrest
"Fob" James during the 1994 campaign.3 1 James subsequently
mentioned the idea of reinstating chain gangs on a radio talk
show.3 2  The idea was met with great public approval. 33  After
James won the gubernatorial race, he appointed Jones Commis-
sioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections.3 4
The make-up of Alabama chain gangs was determined in one
of two ways. Prisons sent parole or probation violators to work on
a chain gang, based on the perception that these convicts needed
additional deterrence.35 Prisons also used chain gangs as punish-
ment for violations of prison rules.3 6
The first chain gangs appeared in the spring of 1995 and
worked along public roads clearing debris and weeds.31 Prisoners
wore white uniforms and caps marked with "CHAIN GANG" while
working in groups of five for at least ten hours per day with three-
pound ankle shackles and eight feet of chain continuously con-
necting one inmate to the next. 38 The chain gangs worked next to
28. Alabama to Reinstate Chain Gangs, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Mar.
4, 1995, at A14.
29. Id.
30. Schone, supra note 7, at 82.
31. Id.
32. Id. (describing how James accepted as a compliment the host's reference to
chain gangs as "Operation Humiliation").
33. Alabamans have responded 'favorably' to the return of chain gangs.
"Drivers roll down their windows to taunt the prisoners, barking like dogs. Others look
on the predominantly black gangs and feel nostalgia for the South they knew as chil-
dren. I love seeing 'em in chains,' one elderly white woman said. 'They ought to make
them pick cotton."' Brent Staples, The Chain Gang Show, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept.
17, 1995 at 62, 62.
34. See Schone, supra note 7, at 82.
35. Telephone Interview with Rhonda Brownstein, Attorney, Southern Poverty
Law Center (Nov. 20, 1995). Prison officials allowed minimum security prison-
ers-unlike medium security prisoners-to work free of chains. State prisons did
not use maximum security prisoners on chain gangs because of the belief that
these prisoners posed too great a risk on a chain gang. Id.
36. Id. Brownstein indicated that most Alabama chain gang prisoners were
placed on gangs because they were repeat offenders. Id.
37. Leland & Smith, supra note 7, at 58.




public highways for the express purpose of satisfying the public
desire for vengeance. 39 In August 1995, Alabama officials began
using chain gangs to break rock on prison grounds.40 Prisoners
broke large boulders into little pieces with sledgehammers while
chained together in groups. 41 Although the Alabama state high-
way department professed no need for the resulting gravel, 42
prison officials maintained the gravel would be used on prison
roads. 43
C. Alabama Retreats from Its Chain Gang Policy
Although Abraham McCord's death sealed the fate of Ala-
bama's chain gangs,44 other factors laid the groundwork for the
change in policy. 45 The shooting, pressure from the lawsuit 46 and
Commissioner Jones' over-zealous suggestion that women be
placed on chain gangs 47 forced Alabama officials to re-examine
chain gang policies. Although Alabama's original policy main-
39. Staples, supra note 33, at 62. While the effectiveness of the gangs is uncer-
tain, they seem to have a societal purpose:
The highway crews allegedly clear weeds and debris, but this is impossi-
ble to do on any useful scale with five men chained eight feet apart, each
stumbling when the next does. The real reason for stretching legions of
chained, white-suited men for a mile or so along the highway is to let mo-
torists gorge on a visible symbol of punishment and humiliation.
Id. See also Schone, supra note 7, at 85 (noting that Alabama's form of vengeance
is gaining national attention).
40. Schone, supra note 7, at 85, 132. To defend the merits of the program,
Jones stated, "The rock-breaking program is our way of finding something mean-
ingful for these inmates to do." Alabama Inmates Return to Chain Gangs Today,
STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 21, 1995, at 2.
Under Joe Hopper, the new Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Cor-
rections (hereinafter Corrections Commissioner), Alabama inmates no longer
broke boulders. Said Hopper, "I've done away with [the rock pile]. It was nonpro-
ductive." Hopper Says He's No Softy, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, July 8, 1996, at
5A. Commissioner Hopper reassigned inmates at Limestone Correctional Facility
to dig up tree stumps because "[tihat's productive and, at the same time, it's a lot
harder work than was being performed on the rock pile." Id. Hopper was ap-
pointed when Jones was demoted in April 1996. See infra note 51 and accompa-
nying text.
41. Schone, supra note 7, at 132.
42. Id.
43. Alabama Becomes First State to Bring Back Chain Gangs, BALTIMORE SUN,
Aug. 22, 1995, at 6A. Alabama officials' statements about the meaningful nature
of chain gang work were undermined by statements about chain gangs' additional
goals of humiliation and embarrassment. Schone, supra note 7, at 82.
44. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
45. See Alabama Backtracks on Its Chain Gangs, supra note 4, at 1.
46. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing class-action lawsuit
filed by Alabama chain gang prisoners).
47. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
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tained that guards would not hesitate to shoot if a prisoner at-
tempted to escape,48 officials quickly changed the policy and
stopped chaining inmates together after realizing the threat of
being shot was not enough to deter prisoners from causing trouble
on chain gangs.49 If the creation of chain gangs had been moti-
vated by a sincere attempt to curb recidivism rather than by public
impatience with the criminal justice system, the shooting death of
a prisoner might have functioned as a firm warning to other pris-
oners, rather than as the impetus to abandon the entire get-tough
policy.
Sexism played an unexpected role in the demise of Alabama's
chain gangs. After Commissioner Jones suggested in April that
female prisoners be put on chain gangs, Governor James declared
that "[t]here will be no woman on any chain gang in the state of
Alabama today, tomorrow or any time under my watch."50 James
quickly demoted Jones and appointed a new prison commissioner
who was more willing to compromise on chain gang issues. 51 So-
cial progressives who had argued from the beginning that the
chain gangs were degrading and inhumane suddenly became
strange bedfellows with conservatives like Governor James, whose
disapproval for female chain gangs seemed to stem from contempt
48. Adam Cohen, Back on the Chain Gang, TIME, May 15, 1995, at 26, 26. Ala-
bama officials were very clear about the purpose of the gun-wielding chain gang
guards. Commissioner Jones stated, "If they try to escape, our officers are going to
shoot them." Id. Additionally, Jones stated, "It became real humane on my part to
put these inmates out there in leg irons because they have virtually no chance of
escaping .... Therefore they're not going to get shot." Leland & Smith, supra note
7, at 58.
49. McCord was shot and killed on May 15, 1996, and the practice of chaining
inmates together was stopped on May 21. State Changes Restraints for Chain
Gang Innates, supra note 1, at 3F. McCord was not attempting to escape when he
was shot; he was attacking another chain gang prisoner. Id. Presumably, it was
easier for state officials to defend a prison guard's actions in shooting an escapee
than it was for them to defend McCord's death, because of the public safety con-
cerns involved in a prisoner escape.
50. Official Fired over Female Chain Gangs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1996, at A17.
Apparently Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Arizona's Maricopa County does not share Gover-
nor James' aversion to female chain gangs. Declaring himself to be an "equal op-
portunity incarcerator," Arpaio announced in August 1996 that female prisoners
would begin chain gang duty the following month. Chain Gang for Females,
PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), Aug. 26, 1996, at 4. "Women do hard labour at
home--washing floors and housework--so I don't think this labour is going to
bother them." Equality on Chain Gangs as Women Get the Call-Up, DAILY MAIL
(London, Eng.), Aug. 27, 1996, at 24, available in LEXIS, Associated Newspapers
Ltd., Daily Mail file.
51. See Official Fired over Fenale Chain Gangs, supra note 50, at A17. Gover-
nor James appointed Joe Hopper to replace Jones as Corrections Commissioner.
State Changes Restraints for Chain Gang Inmates, supra note 1, at 3F.
[Vol. 15:127
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for another opportunity for gender equality.52 In the end, just a
year after reintroducing chain gangs, Alabama officials acquiesced
to critics who argued that chain gangs were dangerous and simply
a bad idea.53
D. The Future of Chain Gangs: A Look at Florida
Questions remain about the future of prisoner chain gangs.
The social consciousness that prompted the rebirth of chain gangs
is still evidenced in public concern about crime and frustration
with the criminal justice system.54 Although Alabama has banned
52. Governor James' paternalistic statement that he would not allow women
on Alabama chain gangs "under [his] watch" demonstrates his sexist views. See
text accompanying note 50. Additionally, the fact that he promptly demoted Jones
when Jones announced plans for female chain gangs shows James' strong convic-
tions about keeping women off chain gangs. In one newspaper account, the Gov-
ernor's director of information, Alfred Sawyer, stated that the Governor "opposes
women on chain gangs as a matter of principle." Malcolm Daniels, Lawyer: All-
Male Chain Gangs Illegal, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, May 4, 1996, at 3F. Sawyer
also said that "state law forbids 'a woman from being used to do manual labor' on a
highway." Id.
53. See Chain Gangs Falling Apart, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 23, 1996, at 37; Cor-
rective Moves, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 22, 1996, at 1OA; Inmate Work- Ala-
bama Sees the Light on Dated Chain Gangs, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), June
24, 1996, at 6A; No Great Loss, Chain Gangs Had Many Drawbacks, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, June 23, 1996, at 2F.
54. See Peter J. Benekos & Alida V. Merlo, Three Strikes and You're Out!: The
Political Sentencing Game, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1995, at 3. A recent newspaper
editorial in Arizona demonstrates that some advocates of chain gangs have been
deterred by neither Alabama's abandonment of chain gangs nor a recent escape of
an inmate from an Arizona work crew:
Abandon all prisons because some inmates escape? That is unadulterated
nonsense .... [H]ere, roadside, is the application of justice: Inmates are
working in full view of the taxpayers. They are engaged in honest labor.
They are not lifting weights. They are not smoking marijuana in the
prison yard. They are not crafting weapons from the prison cafeteria.
They are working, sweating, producing. They are being punished and in
that punishment, they are providing restitution to the core of society they
have harmed.
Work as a Corrective, PHOENIX GAZETTE, July 16, 1996, at B4.
Modern penological theories support the proposition that decisions to reinstate
chain gangs are being made in spite of evidence that rehabilitative efforts such as
education and vocational training contribute better than punitive "deterrence" to
lower recidivism rates. See generally Jurg Gerber & Eric J. Fritsch, Adult Aca-
demic and Vocational Correctional Education Programs: A Review of Recent Re-
search, 22 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 119 (1995) (explaining that studies show a high
success rate for academic and vocational correctional education programs). The
debate between proponents of retributive deterrence and proponents of rehabilita-
tion continues but retribution is currently the predominant influence in North
American prison policy. See R.A. DUFF & DAVID GARLAND, A READER ON
PUNISHMENT 12 (1994) (discussing the movement in the United States for deter-
minate sentencing).
Although studies of the effect of prisoner education on recidivism do not pres-
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the practice of chaining prisoners together, state prisoners and
county jail inmates in other states remain at risk of being put on
chain gangs.
Arizona, Florida, Iowa and Wisconsin followed Alabama's
lead and implemented chain gang programs. 55 Tennessee and
Oklahoma each have at least one county that operates inmate
chain gangs.5 6 In Cheatham County, Tennessee Sheriff Pat Chan-
dler began chaining inmates to each other in December 1995. 57
ent overwhelming statistics, there are reasons for guarded optimism about the
possibilities of prisoner rehabilitation. Gerber & Fritsch, supra, at 135-37. Gerber
and Fritsch compiled the results of studies spanning about twenty years and con-
cluded that "the research shows a fair amount of support for the hypotheses that
adult academic and vocational correctional education programs lead to fewer disci-
plinary violations during incarceration, reductions in recidivism, to increases in
employment opportunities, and to increases in participation in education upon re-
lease." Id. at 136-37. They point out that many factors influence recidivism, such
as employment stability, living arrangements, income and chemical use, which
may explain why the inverse correlation between prisoner education and recidi-
vism is not stronger. Id. at 136. In addition to evidence that rehabilitation effec-
tively reduces recidivism for at least some prisoners, studies have produced no
substantial evidence that retributive methods effectively deter crime. DUFF &
GARLAND, supra, at 11.
55. Alabama Backtracks on Its Chain Gangs, supra note 4, at 1; Settlement
Will Ban Alabama's Prison Chain Gangs, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1996, at A14. In
June 1996, Wisconsin became the most recent state to reinstate chain gangs. See
Amy Rinard, Quiet Disapproval: Chain Gang Curb Draws Veto, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, June 8, 1996, at Al. Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson vetoed
part of the chain gang bill that would have limited chain gangs' work to prison
grounds, thereby approving legislation permitting chain gangs to work in public.
Id.
56. Cheatham County, Tennessee, continues to operate chain gangs with
county jail inmates despite what happened in Alabama. Renee Robinson, Alabama
Drops Gangs' Chains; Are We Next?, TENNESSEAN, June 21, 1996, at 1A. Cheat-
ham County Sheriff Pat Chandler said in response to Alabama's settlement:
"We're running at full blast.... We will continue our program until it is confirmed
by the state attorney general to stop." Id.
Creek County, Oklahoma, is operating voluntary chain gangs, which Sheriff
Larry Fugate is administering. Jerry Hereden, Chain Gangs Re-Emerge in One
Oklahoma County-Some Say Crews Exist for Political Reasons, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 18, 1996, at 45A. Inmates are not forced to work on chain gangs, but
if they do not, "they're stuck in a cell with just a mattress, a blanket and three
meals a day .... If they choose not to work, they lose all privileges. This includes
smoking cigarettes and watching television." Id. Creek County inmates wear
chains around their waists and are chained to each other in groups of five. Id.
Although Fugate denies that he created chain gangs for political gain, critics point
out that he changed inmates' garb to conspicuous striped "jailbird" suits and that
inmates are transported in a bus with lettering on the side that reads: "Larry Fu-
gate-Inmate Work Program." Id.
It is difficult to track county sheriffs' use of chain gangs because chain gangs
in the county context are implemented by prison officials without the legislation or
administrative action that accompanies the use of chain gangs at the state level.
Telephone Interview with Rhonda Brownstein, supra note 35; see generally Here-
den, supra, at 45A (explaining policies which the sheriff implemented).
57. Ellen Margulies, Counties Don't Agree on Chain Gangs: Some Awaiting
[Vol. 15:127
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None of the states chains inmates to each other as Alabama
did; instead, they chain prisoners individually.58 In Florida, how-
ever, State Senator Charlie Crist is not satisfied with individually
chained prisoners and he is not willing to follow Alabama's retreat
from chain gangs.59 Although the legislation did not specify that
prisoners be chained together, Crist, who sponsored Florida's 1995
legislation creating chain gangs,60 now argues that working pris-
oners in individual chains does not do enough to shame them.61
He plans to introduce a clarifying bill during the next legislative
session to strengthen Florida's chain gang message.62
Court's Decision, TENNESSEAN, Dec. 12, 1995, at lB. Sheriff Chandler apparently
acted alone in implementing chain gangs in Cheatham County because neither the
state Department of Corrections nor any other Tennessee county operates inmate
chain gangs. Id. As of September 1996, no lawsuits challenging the chain gangs
have been filed by Cheatham County inmates. Telephone Interview with Staff
Member, Cheatham County Sheriffs Department (Sept. 12, 1996). In the words of
a Sheriffs Department official, "Everybody's happy-they're just thrilled to be out
[working on chain gangs]." Id.
58. Telephone Interview with Staff Member, Cheatham County Sheriffs De-
partment (Sept. 12, 1996). For further clarification of the different methods of
chaining inmates, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Wisconsin utilizes stun belts to provide security and ensure individually
chained inmates do not escape. State Rep. Eugene Hahn, Two Views: Seeking the
Best Way to Reduce Crime and Its Cost; 'Chain Gangs,' Stun Belts Provide Secu-
rity, Deterrent, WIS. ST. J., June 27, 1996, at 13A_ Proponents argue that stun
belts are a humane and medically safe alternative to lethal force. Id. Opponents,
such as Amnesty International, argue that stun belts are inhumane and a form of
torture. Id. Gene Atherton, a Federal Department of Corrections security spe-
cialist in Florida, said of stun belts: "It doesn't hurt that bad and doesn't cause
any serious damage or injury, and it certainly gets people's attention." Stun Belts
on Inmnates Humane or Torture?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 3, 1996, at A20. Stun
belts pack a 45,000-volt charge which can render a person unconscious. Id.
In the wake of McCord's death in Alabama, the use of stun belts creates a co-
nundrum. It is difficult to evaluate which is worse: using lethal gunfire as secu-
rity for chain gangs or placing stun belts on each prisoner, factoring in the possi-
bility for non-lethal but inhumane abuse of such measures.
59. Rob Shaw, Senator Wants Chain Gains [sic] on the Highways, TAMPA TRIB.,
Aug. 8, 1996, at Metro 6. Crist has been nicknamed "Chain Gang Charlie" for his
chain gang efforts in Florida. Cheatham County Puts Its Prisoners to Work, COM.
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Dec. 7, 1995, at B1. An official in the legal department
for Florida's Department of Corrections stated that as of January 17, 1997, no law-
suits over chain gangs were pending. Telephone Interview with Jeanne Murray,
Law Clerk, Florida Department of Corrections (Jan. 17, 1997).
60. Senator Wants to Strengthen Chain Gang Law, LEDGER (Lakeland, Fla.),
Aug. 8, 1996, at B3.
61. Crist's Shame Gangs, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at 6A.
62. Senator Wants to Strengthen Chain Gang Law, supra note 60, at B3; Reena
Shah Stamets, Crist Seeks to Tighten Shackles, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 8,
1996, at 5B; see generally Crist's Shame Gangs, supra note 61, at 6A (discussing
the development of Crist's chain gang program).
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Crist's proposed bill clarifies three things: (1) chain gangs
must work alongside major highways, 63 (2) they must include vio-
lent offenders and (3) inmates must be chained together in groups
of at least five. 64 If such a bill becomes law in Florida, it is highly
probable that an inmate will bring a lawsuit similar to the one set-
tled in Alabama to challenge the constitutionality of chain gangs.65
Because Alabama's chain gangs were abandoned before a court
could rule on their constitutionality, the constitutional questions
raised by Alabama prisoners remain unanswered.
II. Eighth Amendment Precedent
Besides raising serious health and safety concerns, chain
gangs violate a fundamental-if as yet unrecognized-right to be
treated with human dignity. Although other constitutional argu-
ments may be available, the Eighth Amendment is most appropri-
ate for challenging this penal practice.66 This section offers a brief
background of pertinent Eighth Amendment precedent.
63. See Stamets, supra note 62, at 5B. Crist is concerned that the symbolic
value of chain gangs is lost when inmates do not work alongside busy highways.
Expressing the reason behind this belief, Crist said, "We shouldn't have pretend
chain gangs for people who do not commit pretend crimes.... It is symbolic and
dramatic and it is intended to be." Id. Crist's focus on punishment is unambigu-
ous: "This is not cruel, this is not inhumane ... the people who need to be on these
chain gangs are cruel and inhumane." Shaw, supra note 59, at Metro 6.
64. Stamets, supra note 62, at 5B.
65. One Florida inmate has sued, claiming chain gangs violate the Constitu-
tion as ex-post facto laws. Helms v. Crist, No. GC-G-95-2196 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed
Sept. 15, 1995). The inmate had not, nor was he likely to, perform chain gang la-
bor and the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Florida dismissed his claim for lack of
standing. Id.
66. Claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and
the Thirteenth Amendment may be possible. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause states: "INlor shall any State ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The premise of an Equal Protection argument would be that a prisoner who is
forced to labor on the chain gang is being treated differently than another prisoner
in the same state who committed the same crime, or a crime of like degree, who is
not forced to labor on a chain gang. However, at least one appellate court has held
that as long as a state is not doing something illegal, it can generally make rules
that affect different prisoners differently. See Wendt v. Lynaugh, 841 F.2d 619,
621 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying this rationale for different treatment to prisoners'
compensation for work). Under this formulation, chain gangs would have to be
proven illegal before an Equal Protection claim would become effective, which
would make the Equal Protection claim moot.
It would also be difficult to prove that chain gangs are racially motivated,
since they are applied to male inmates of all races. However, about two-thirds of
Alabama prisoners are African-American. Schone, supra note 7, at 80; cf. Leland
& Smith, supra note 7, at 58 (noting that chain gangs are up to eighty percent Af-
rican-American). In Jones v. Mayer Co., the Court noted Congress' broad power to
regulate invidious, racially motivated discrimination, i.e., the badges and incidents
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Throughout Eighth Amendment precedent, the Supreme
Court has required plaintiffs to fulfill objective and/or subjective
standards to prove Eighth Amendment violations. The importance
of both the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth
Amendment claim will be noted throughout this section and ex-
panded further in Part III.
of slavery, even by private citizens, pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment. See
392 U.S. 409, 438-41 (1968) (citations omitted). Jones involved a private real es-
tate developer's refusal to sell to African-Americans and the plaintiffs' invocation
of § 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, created under the power of the Thirteenth
Amendment, as prohibiting such discrimination. Id. at 412, 438-39. The Court's
extension of the Amendment's reach to the "badges and incidents of slavery" does
not apply to a direct reading of the Amendment, absent such a statute. See id. at
438-41. The Jones Court's recognition of Congress' broad power to eradicate racial
barriers focuses on section two of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Enabling
Clause. Id. at 439. Chain gang prisoners would need to affix their claim to federal
legislation such as § 1982 to receive the benefit of such a broad reading of the
Thirteenth Amendment's reach.
The Thirteenth Amendment reads:
Section 1. Neither slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The most obvious challenge to using the Thirteenth
Amendment to argue against the use of chain gangs is that it explicitly excepts
prisoners from "involuntary servitude." An Arkansas case exemplifies the limita-
tions of the Thirteenth Amendment in the convict labor context:
The Arkansas system of working convicts is not "slavery" in the
constitutional sense of the term. The State does not claim to own the
bodies of its prisoners. The situation does involve "servitude," and there is
no doubt whatever that the "servitude" is "involuntary."
But, it is equally clear that this servitude has been imposed as
punishment for crimes whereof the inmates have been duly convicted....
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 372 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
Despite these practical limitations, the presence of convict chain gangs is
strongly associated with images of slavery. Lichtenstein explains, "Everywhere
... slavery and punishment have been an inseparable dyad, in advanced as well as
primitive societies." LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 21, at 187. He notes:
Racial disproportion is the most striking continuity in the history of
southern, and indeed US, prisons.... Not only in the South, but in the
USA as a whole, there is still no separating the question of punishment
from the matter of race; and punishment has always been related to labor,
both forced and free.
Id. at 191-92. It is clear that chain gangs invoke powerful images of slavery, but it
is not as clear how to utilize the Constitution to invalidate the practice. Lichten-
stein addresses the possibility of a legal challenge to forced prisoner labor:
"[These restrictions are likely to withstand constitutional challenge, since the
13th Amendment allows involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime and may
thus attach some of the characteristics of slavery to prisoners .... Id. at 194
(quoting JOAN MULLEN ET AL., NATL INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRIVATIZATION OF
CORRECTIONS, ISSUES AND PRACTICES 24 (1985)).
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Prior to the 1970s, prisoners were unsuccessful in raising
prison condition claims under the Eighth Amendment.6 7 The
67. 1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 2.01 at 23-24 & n.l (2d
ed. 1993) (citations omitted). The Eighth Amendment's creation serves as a guide
to its interpretation. The language comes from the English Bill of Rights, written
in 1689. LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT 3 (1975). The Articles of Confederation, as well as many original
state constitutions, contained a cruel and unusual punishments clause, supporting
the inference that even prior to the 19th century the freedom from cruel and un-
usual punishment was considered a fundamental right by lawmakers. Id. at 5-6.
The Eighth Amendment remained relatively dormant for nearly 100 years af-
ter it became part of the Constitution. It was not until 1878 that the Supreme
Court issued its first significant Eighth Amendment opinion. In Wilkerson v.
Utah, the Court upheld a sentence of death by shooting and concluded that the
Eighth Amendment was meant only to prohibit torture in addition to death, such
as being dragged to an execution. 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878). In what turned out
to be an understatement, the Court found that "[d]ifficulty would attend the effort
to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides
that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted." Id.
Beginning in 1910, the Court entered a new era of more progressive, socially-
conscious Eighth Amendment interpretation. See Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910). Weems involved a Coast Guard official convicted of falsifying rec-
ords in a cash book. Id. at 357. The statute under which he was found guilty pro-
vided for severe minimum punishments, including twelve years and a day of im-
prisonment in chains from wrist to ankle, deprivation of parental and property
rights, the permanent loss of the right to vote and lifetime surveillance by authori-
ties. BERKSON, supra, at 66.
The Supreme Court held that these penalties were "repugnant to the [Buill of
[R]ights." Weems, 217 U.S. at 382. Justice McKenna wrote for the majority, stat-
ing, "[tlime works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions." Id. at 373.
Weems is rich with such language, advocating a dynamic reading of the Constitu-
tion. Justice McKenna further stated that the cruel and unusual punishment
clause "may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Id.
at 378.
The next case that contributed significantly to the development of Eighth
Amendment interpretation was Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). In Trop, the
Supreme Court held that denationalization of an Army deserter violated the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 101. Trop's significance in the Eighth Amendment line
of cases was established by its paraphrase of Weems: "The Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." 356 U.S. at 101. Similar to the Weents decision, the Trop
opinion at length advocated a dynamic interpretation of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause. 365 U.S. at 99-104. The Court examined the history behind
the Amendment, stating that "[tihe basic concept underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment is nothing less than the dignity of man." Id. at 100.
Trop discussed many aspects of the Eighth Amendment. Chief Justice War-
ren's opinion began its analysis of the Eighth Amendment by pointing out that
simply because the death penalty is legal, it does not follow that anything less
than death is legal: "[lit is equally plain that the existence of the death penalty is
not a license to the Government to devise any punishment short of death within
the limit of its imagination." Id. at 99. The Court then parsed the clause and ex-
amined what was meant by "unusual." Id. at 100-01 & n.32. The Court defined
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Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was interpreted to apply
only to sentencing, and not to what happened to a prisoner while
serving a sentence.68 Beginning in 1976 with Estelle v. Gainble,
69
federal judges began to create minimal constitutional standards
for treatment of prisoners and used the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment Clause to enforce these standards.
70
In Estelle, the Court introduced "deliberate indifference" as
the governing standard for determining whether the denial of
medical care to a prisoner was unconstitutional.7 ' Although lim-
ited to medical care, the Estelle decision is significant for its
groundbreaking role in applying the Eighth Amendment to prison
conditions.7 2
In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court used an objective standard
to identify Eighth Amendment violations, holding that the Consti-
tution is violated if inmates are deprived of "the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities."7 3 The Chapman Court took the posi-
tion that harsh conditions "are part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society."
74
"unusual" in the ordinary sense, "signifying something different from that which is
generally done." Id. at 101 n.32. In Trop's case, the Court stated, "[tihere may be
involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is instead the total
destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form of punish-
ment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political
existence that was centuries in the development." Id. at 101. The Court then
moved into a general discussion of its duty to uphold the Constitution employing
reason and judgment, not personal passions. Id. at 103. Trop represents a well-
rounded, thorough and forward-looking interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.
68. MUSHLIN, supra note 67, at 23-24.
69. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
70. See Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth Anendnent Prison Juris-
prudence: Conditions of Confinement, 48 SMU L. REV. 373, 374-75 (1995).
71. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104. Gamble, an inmate in a Texas prison,
alleged that he hurt his back during a work assignment and that the medical care
he received for the injury was inadequate. Id. at 107. The Court reasoned that
the government has an "obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is
punishing by incarceration" and held that "deliberate indifference to serious medi-
cal needs" would violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 103, 106.
Estelle's "deliberate indifference" standard is subjective, requiring a show-
ing that officials deliberately ignored prisoners' needs. See id. at 104-05.
72. MUSHLIN, supra note 67, at 24.
73. 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Chapman involved a constitutional challenge to
the practice of housing two prisoners in one cell at an Ohio state prison. The
Court reasoned that while "the Constitution does not mandate comfortable pris-
ons," id. at 349, "[c]onditions [of confinement] must not involve the wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the se-
verity of the crime warranting imprisonment[,]" id. at 347. The Court held that
the overcrowding did not violate the Constitution. Id.
74. Id. Chapman emphasized that discomfort in prison is simply part of the
punishment. Id. This view comports with current attitudes toward any asserted
prisoner claims. See Wesley Smith, Jailhouse Blues, NAT'L REV., June 13, 1994, at
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The Court returned to a subjective test in 1986 in Whitley v.
Albers.75 Albers involved a prisoner shot during a prison riot. The
Court determined that the appropriate question was whether the
prison official acted "in good faith" or with "obduracy and wanton-
ness." 76  The Court's opinion emphasized the need to defer to
prison officials in dealing with emergencies. 77
In 1991, the Court finally reconciled the subjective and objec-
tive standards it had used to evaluate potential Eighth Amend-
ment violations in the context of incarceration. In Wilson v. Seiter,
the Court required that prisoners satisfy both subjective and objec-
40. Smith places quotation marks around the words "rights," "overcrowding" and
"cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 40-42. This indicates that he does not see
these concepts as legitimate.
Smith argues that the rights of law-abiding citizens should not apply to pris-
oners. He advocates harsher prisons, stating:
Groups like the ACLU's National Prison Project argue that states must
treat prisoners much as they do citizens at large. Federal judges have
agreed; and in their pursuit to elevate the legal status of prisoners to that
of law-abiding people, they have removed the concept of prison as pun-
ishment, and with it much of the deterrent effect of imprisonment.
Id. at 40. Smith does not offer facts to back up his implicit assertion that impris-
onment previously offered more deterrence than it currently does. He claims that
prisoners' rights and the rights of others in the community are mutually exclusive:
The federal judiciary's activism stems from an abstract theory of individ-
ual rights that disregards the rights of the community. Deliberately de-
tached from the effects of their decisions on society, federal judges have
acted as if they intended to strip communities of any power to defend
themselves.
Id. at 44. This view is misguided. Smith's approach might be better placed in the
context of inadequate sentence lengths. In the context of excessive force or prison
condition cases, however, the fact that prisoners assert their rights does not have a
negative effect on average citizens. As noted, there is no real evidence that puni-
tive prison conditions deter crime. See supra note 54.
75. 475 U.S. 312 (1986). Justice O'Connor wrote for a five-member majority
including Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell and Rehnquist. Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented. Id.
76. Id. at 319. Rioting prisoners took a guard hostage and in the process of
controlling the situation, another guard shot Albers, an inmate who was not in-
volved in the riot. Id. at 314-17. The Court held that the shooting did not violate
the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 320-22.
77. Id. at 319-20. Justice O'Connor seemed very concerned about the danger of
employing hindsight to fault prison officials. "The infliction of pain in the course of
a prison security measure, therefore, does not amount to cruel and unusual pun-
ishment simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force
authorized or applied for security purposes was unreasonable, and hence unneces-
sary in the strict sense." Id. at 319. Justice O'Connor characterized quelling a
prison riot as an activity which required prison officials to balance interests, more
than in a situation like Estelle. She wrote, "The deliberate indifference standard
articulated in Estelle was appropriate in the context presented in that case be-
cause the State's responsibility to attend to the medical needs of prisoners does not




tive elements to prove Eighth Amendment violations.78 Justice
Scalia, writing for a five-member majority, reasoned that there
must be an objective "deprivation of a single, identifiable human
need such as food, warmth, or exercise" for an Eighth Amendment
violation. 79 The Court explicitly stated that such a violation can
never occur without subjective intent.8 0 Something that is more
than "accidental" meets the requisite level of intent.81
The next year, in Hudson v. McMillian, the Court differenti-
ated between excessive force cases and prison conditions cases but
continued to require fulfillment of both subjective and objective
components to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.8 2 Prison
guards beat Hudson, an inmate, causing painful injuries but no
permanent damage. 83 The Court held that in this excessive force
context, serious injury is not required to find an Eighth Amend-
ment violation.8 4 However, in the prison conditions context,
"extreme deprivations" are required to fulfill the objective compo-
nent of the Eighth Amendment.8 5 The Court utilized the subjec-
tive tests established in Estelle ("deliberate indifference" 86) and
Whitley ("maliciously and sadistically"8 7) and applied them to
prison conditions and excessive force cases, respectively.8 8
Helling v. McKinney, the next Supreme Court Eighth
Amendment case, involved an inmate who claimed that his Eighth
78. 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991). Wilson, an inmate in an Ohio prison, alleged
that overcrowding, excessive noise, inadequate heating, cooling and ventilation,
unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities, insufficient locker
storage space, as well as housing with mentally and physically ill inmates violated
the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 296. The Court held that Wilson's combination of
claims did not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 305-06.
79. Id. at 304.
80. Id. at 300. Subjective intent is described as "some mental element... at-
tributed to the inflicting officer." Id.
81. Id.
82. 503 U.S. 1 (1992). Justice O'Connor wrote for a five-member majority, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy and Souter joined;
Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred in the judgment and Justices Thomas
and Scalia dissented. Id. at 3.
83. Id. at 4. One prison official held Hudson in place while another beat him.
Id. Hudson suffered bruises and swelling of his face and mouth and a cracked
dental plate. Id. The supervisor on duty watched and told the officers "not to have
too much fun." Id.
84. Id. at 9-10.
85. Id. at 9.
86. Id. at 5-6; see supra note 71 and accompanying text (describing the Estelle
test).
87. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; see supra note 76 and accompanying text
(identifying the Whitley standard).
88. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5-8.
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Amendment rights were violated because he was exposed to sec-
ond-hand smoke from his cellmate.8 9 Although McKinney had not
suffered any identifiable harm at the time he sued, the Court held
that he had stated a valid claim, extending the reach of the Eighth
Amendment to include the risk of future harm.90 The Court rea-
soned that if a prisoner is exposed to a risk "so grave that it vio-
lates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwill-
ingly to such a risk," the Eighth Amendment is violated.91
The most recent Supreme Court Eighth Amendment case,
Farmer v. Brennan, maintained the Court's adherence to subjec-
tive and objective components of the Eighth Amendment test.92
Farmer involved a transsexual prisoner who claimed officials acted
with deliberate indifference to his safety in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 93 Farmer, although biologically male, dressed as a
woman. 94 After a transfer to a higher security penitentiary,
Farmer was placed in the general male population and was alleg-
edly raped by a cellmate. 95 Farmer's attorneys argued that offi-
cials should have considered the history of violence at the prison to
which Farmer was transferred and the fact that Farmer's feminine
appearance increased the likelihood of being assaulted.96 The Su-
89. 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993). Justice White wrote for a seven-member majority;
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy and
Souter joined the majority opinion, while Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.
Id. at 2477. McKinney complained that his cellmate smoked five packs of ciga-
rettes a day. Id. at 2478.
90. Id. at 2480. The Court analogized second-hand smoke to drinking water,
stating that a prisoner would not have to wait for dysentery to set in before as-
serting an Eighth Amendment claim. Id.
91. Id. at 2482. The Court did not determine whether second-hand smoke
reached the level of a constitutional violation, but sent the issue to the lower court
on remand. Id.
92. 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). Justice Souter wrote for the majority, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy and Ginsburg joined; Justices Blackmun and Stevens filed concurring opin-
ions and Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment. Id. at 1974.
93. Id. at 1975.
94. Id. Farmer underwent estrogen therapy, received silicone breast implants
and made an unsuccessful attempt at a black-market testicle-removal surgery. Id.
(citing Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 320 (7th Cir. 1993)). Although wearing the
standard uniform, Farmer was described as wearing prison clothing "in a feminine
manner, as by displaying a shirt off one shoulder." Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1975. It
is the regular practice of federal prisons to house preoperative transsexual inmates
with prisoners of the same biological sex. Id.
95. Id. Farmer was housed in several prisons, sometimes in the general male
prison population and sometimes in segregation. Id. Farmer was transferred
from a federal correctional facility in Wisconsin to a penitentiary in Indiana, and
"penitentiaries are typically higher security facilities that house more troublesome




preme Court held that an official will be liable under the Eighth
Amendment if they know that an inmate faces a "substantial risk
of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reason-
able measures to abate it." 97
III. Chain Gangs as a Violation of the Eighth Amendment
In 1958, the Supreme Court coined a phrase that has become
a cornerstone of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: "The basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than
the dignity of man .... The Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."98 The problem with this hopeful statement lies
in its assumption that society will be able to come to a consensus
about what is decent.99 It is painfully obvious that contemporary
society contains viewpoints that could not be farther apart in the
perception of what is a decent, humane way to treat prisoners. Al-
though the courts, and not the whole of society, are responsible for
determining these elusive standards of decency, Eighth Amend-
ment precedent has consistently relied on society's standards as
the measure for how the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
97. Id. at 1984. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of
whether prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to prevent harm
to Farmer. Id. at 1984-85.
98. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958). See supra note 67 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Trop decision). Courts continue to cite this passage
from Trop. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (challenging use of ex-
cessive force under the Eighth Amendment); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
346 (1981) (challenging prison conditions under the Eighth Amendment); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976) (challenging the death penalty under Eighth
Amendment).
99. Additionally, the quoted language assumes that society's standards of de-
cency will evolve. Although there are certain torturous punishments that almost
no one would currently advocate, it is not clear that as a society we are maturing
with regard to standards of decency in the treatment of prisoners. The mere fact
that chain gangs are appearing around the country supports the view that society
is regressing, not maturing, in the area of standards of decency.
The Director of the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives, Rob
Hoelter, sums up this argument: "I find it fascinating the corrections system is
turning back the hands of time when the rest of the world is moving forward."
Alabama to Reinstate Chain Gangs, supra note 28, at A14.
However, it is difficult to consider a better way to allow the Eighth Amend-
ment to evolve:
In an area where court decisions must necessarily be predicated upon
"evolving standards" and "the progress of a maturing society", it is self-
defeating to be bound by one's apprehensions of the limits of prior cases.
Else, how did we develop from the days of pillorying, disemboweling, de-
capitation, and drawing and quartering, and how are we to continue to
protect "the dignity of man"?
Novak v. Beto, 456 F.2d 1303, 1307 (5th Cir. 1972).
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must adapt to changing times. 100 Chain gangs fall squarely into
the midst of this dilemma.
Precedent suggests that three characteristics of chain gangs
could be the basis of an Eighth Amendment claim: (1) the risks
imposed on chain gang prisoners, (2) the intent behind chain gangs
and (3) the deprivation of human dignity that accompanies being
chained to other prisoners. In the argument which follows, sec-
tion A applies the objective component of Eighth Amendment
analysis to the risks involved in chain gang labor. Section B ap-
plies the subjective component of Eighth Amendment analysis to
the intent behind the use of chain gangs. Section C relies on both
the objective and subjective standards of Eighth Amendment
analysis in making a claim based on the deprivation of human
dignity for chain gang prisoners: objective because labor in chains
is a particularly degrading task by most standards, and subjective
because the explicit intent behind chain gangs is to humiliate and
degrade. The human dignity deprivation claim would attempt to
establish "human dignity" as a tangible concept, deserving of con-
stitutional protection. 10 1
A. The Objective Component: Risk of Harm to Prisoners
Prisoners assigned to chain gangs are exposed to substantial
risk, above and beyond what they would be exposed to in the
course of regular prison life. The hazards include danger from
nearby traffic, danger from other prisoners to whom they are
chained' 0 2 and danger from any natural event that would threaten
the safety of a group of people chained together, such as an en-
counter with a poisonous snake. 03
Morris Dees, founder of the Southern Poverty Law Center,
said of the danger experienced by chain gangs: "[Trucks are]
moving past the chain gangs at 70 miles per hour .... It's un-
100. See Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2482 (1993); Hudson, 503 U.S. at
8; Trop, 356 U.S. at 101; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) ("The
clause . . . may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice.")
(emphasis added).
101. Alabama prisoners construed "human dignity" as a tangible, protectable
interest in their complaint. Complaint, supra note 5, at 1.
102. The events leading to McCord's death serve as an example. See supra
notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
103. The complaint notes risks from poisonous snakes, wasps, hornets and fal-
ling trees cut down by prisoners. Complaint, supra note 5, at 6. It states: "Many
inmates have encountered snakes during their work." Id. Poisonous snakes found
in Alabama include rattlers, water moccasins and corals. United States of Amer-
ica. Alabama, in 29 NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 316, 317 (1996).
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safe." 04  The complaint fied in the prisoners' class-action suit
noted several near-accidents in the first two weeks of roadside
chain gangs. 105 One explanation for this may be that the "drivers'
attention is diverted away from the roads, thus increasing the
likelihood of accidents."106
The potential for violence between chain-mates also raises
significant danger for chain gang prisoners. Being chained to-
gether for ten hours a day would cause tension between even the
most patient people. Such action is particularly likely to cause
tension between prisoners, who may already be in prison because
of a tendency towards violence or a lack of judgment in stressful
situations. 0 7 The prisoners are armed with blades, sledgeham-
mers, shovels and axes, creating the potential for deadly violence if
tension escalates. The fact that prisoners are chained together
greatly reduces their ability to defend themselves against any vio-
lent eruptions.
The general risk is exacerbated by the presence of guards
who may shoot if an altercation breaks out or if someone appears
to be attempting to escape. 10 8 It is easy to visualize situations in
which it may appear that an escape attempt is being made when a
prisoner is reacting to a swarm of hornets, a poisonous snake or a
falling tree. The panic that can quickly spread among individuals
chained together places the prisoners at risk of being shot.
In addition to outside factors, each prisoner may be placed in
danger as a result of the actions of his chain-mates. For example,
one prisoner may be working diligently and his chainmate may
start an altercation, causing a guard to shoot at the prisoners, un-
fairly placing the innocent prisoner in great danger. 0 9 While pris-
104. Schone, supra note 7, at 84. The complaint filed on behalf of the class of
prisoners suing over chain gangs echoed Dees' safety concerns. "The use of leg irons
to chain inmates together poses a substantial risk of serious harm or death to plaintiffs
as they labor on the roadside in close proximity to cars and trucks driving at speeds of
over fifty-five miles per hour." Complaint, supra note 5, at 4.
105. Complaint, supra note 5, at 5.
106. Id. at 4.
107. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (explaining that Senator
Crist's proposed legislation in Florida specifies that chain gangs must include vio-
lent offenders).
108. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. Prisoner McCord's death is
direct evidence of the risks posed by chain gangs.
109. Alabama's system proved "effective" at protecting chain gang inmates from
each other in the situation involving McCord. See Chain-Gang Prisoner Killed
During Fight, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, May 16, 1996, at 1A. The prisoner
McCord attacked was not seriously hurt, and the guards shot and killed the "right"
prisoner-the attacker instead of a victim or bystander. However, describing a
system as "efficient" or "effective" that artificially places inmates at increased risk,
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oners face risks just by being incarcerated, on chain gangs the ten-
sion is heightened because guards do not have the security of
locked doors to contain prisoners if a disturbance occurs. This
heightened tension, further increased by public visibility, results
in unfair risks to prisoners.
Unless a prisoner is physically injured while performing
chain gang work, the ability to sue based on risk is critical for the
argument against chain gangs. The many risks faced by chain
gang prisoners-particularly the risk of being shot-present a
strong factual base with which to satisfy the objective component
of the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney established that
an inmate does not have to have suffered any identifiable harm at
the time he sues.1 0 A prisoner can sue based solely on risk, and
the Eighth Amendment is violated if a prisoner is exposed to a risk
"so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to ex-
pose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.""' The challenge for a
chain gang plaintiff would be proving that the degree of risk is suf-
ficiently unacceptable.
The obvious difficulty presented in bringing an Eighth
Amendment claim after Helling is showing that chain gangs create
a risk that "violate[s] contemporary standards of decency."" 2 Per-
haps the best way for opponents of chain gangs to construe this
phrase would be to return to its origins in Trop and focus on the
emphasis the Court placed on the evolution of such standards of
decency." 3 Trop assumed that society would mature in its treat-
ment of prisoners, and, by implication, even if the public is hungry
for vengeance, it is the responsibility of the Supreme Court to act
as the voice of humanity and reason. 114 The spirit of Trop could be
used to argue against chain gangs based on what should be the
maturing and evolving standards of society, even if these stan-
dards do not yet match public opinion." 5
necessitating the killing of one prisoner to save another, is tragic, and should be
unconstitutional under Helling and Farmer. See infra text accompanying notes
110, 117.
110. 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2481 (1993).
111. Id. at 2482. The risk in Helling came from the prisoner's cellmate's con-
stant smoking. Id. The Court did not make a finding as to whether second-hand
smoke was a grave enough risk to satisfy this new standard, but the Court clearly
established that a prisoner did not have to show present injury to establish an
Eighth Amendment claim. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. "This Court has had little occasion to give precise content to the Eighth
Amendment, and, in an enlightened democracy such as ours, this is not surpris-
ing." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
115. Id. at 99-104.
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The analysis in Farmer v. Brennan also offers a general ap-
proach toward prisoner claims that may be helpful in potential
chain gang lawsuits. 116 The Farmer Court recognized that prison-
ers are in a vulnerable position with limited capabilities to defend
themselves against danger. 1 7 As already discussed, this vulner-
ability is intensified in the case of chain gangs. 118 The progres-
siveness of the Court in Farmer is promising for the case against
chain gangs. Since the Court has expressed sympathy for a trans-
sexual exposed to danger in prison, it may also extend sympathy to
prisoners who are forced to labor on chain gangs.
B. The Subjective Component: Intent Behind Chain Gangs
The subjective requirement of an Eighth Amendment analy-
sis of chain gangs would probably apply to the prison officials who
use their authority to implement the programs. 119 Commissioner
Jones, for example, served in this capacity in Alabama, 120 and
similar figures would fill this role for other states that may imple-
ment chain gangs, such as Florida.' 2'
Comissioner Jones claimed that chain gangs served both a
cost-saving 122 and a deterrent purpose. 123 Since saving money and
116. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
117. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994).
118. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
119. "Our cases have held that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment
only when two requirements are met." Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1977 (emphasis
added). See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
120. Although this point was not litigated, the settlement reached in the Ala-
bama lawsuit repeatedly named the "Defendant Commissioner of the Department
of Corrections" as the official in control of the chain gang program. Stipulation,
supra, note 7 at 1. At the time the suit was filed, this was Ron Jones, and at the
time of the settlement, it was Joe Hopper. See id. at 1-2. The settlement also
dismissed Governor James from the case because "[tihere is no evidence that dem-
onstrates that Governor James knew that inmates chained together may face a
substantial risk of serious harm or that he disregarded any such risk by failing to
take reasonable measures to abate it." Id.
121. After McCord's death in Alabama, it would be difficult for Florida's Senator
Crist to argue that he did not know about the risk involved with chain gangs. He
has stated that he is "not particularly concerned with the welfare of... murderers,
rapists and robbers." Shaw, supra note 59, at 6.
122. Commissioner Jones backed up the idea to reinstate chain gangs by argu-
ing that they save money. Schone, supra note 7, at 82. He claimed that by chain-
ing men together, he could put twice as many prisoners to work per guard. Id.
However, one reporter watching the chain gangs at work suggested that the cost
savings might not be as great as Commissioner Jones predicted. Id. The reporter
noted that the ratio of guards to prisoners was not one to forty as claimed, but was
actually one to twenty-three. Id. Southern Poverty Law Center Attorney Rhonda
Brownstein agreed that Jones' prisoner-to-guard ratios were incorrect. Telephone
Interview with Rhonda Brownstein, supra note 35.
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deterring crime are not only legal but praiseworthy goals, chain
gang plaintiffs facing such claims in another state would have to
identify the real intent behind the establishment of chain gangs. 1
24
Commissioner Jones' cost-saving justifications were mis-
leading because Alabama was not actually saving money; it was
merely spending less money than if chain gang prisoners were do-
ing the same work while unchained. 125 Commissioner Jones' fi-
nancial justification for chain gangs is further undermined by his
and Governor James' additional stated goals of humiliation and
embarrassment. 126 Jones' credibility is strained when he argues
that money was the primary motivator for implementing chain
gangs and that humiliation of prisoners was merely a fringe bene-
fit. Jones stated that "[tihe whole concept is to put inmates into a
restrictive environment. They are devoid of all things while
they're on the chain gangs and they are required to work very long
hours. It's punitive in and of itself."' 27 Governor James accepted a
reference to chain gangs as "Operation Humiliation" as a compli-
ment and agreed that "[p]art of the deterrence [was] to be embar-
rassed."128
Once startup costs of over $1 million were added, the savings became even
more illusory. Id. Startup costs included 375 sets of chains for $17,000, $1 million
to adapt school buses to hauling prisoners to worksites and an unspecified amount
to convert one wing at the Limestone Correctional Facility to a 400-bed chain gang
dorm, stripped of many comforts. Id. at 80, 82. It would be misleading to calculate
startup costs without contemplating the expense of the state's defense in the pris-
oners' lawsuits, which came as no surprise to Jones. See Working on a Chain
Gang Rattles Alabama Prisoner, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), May 9, 1995, at
Al.
123. Alabama administrators readily admitted that a primary goal of the chain
gangs was simply to make prisoners' lives so miserable that they will never return
to prison. Mark Curriden, Hard Tie, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 74. This goal is
also evidenced by the other privileges that are taken away during a prisoner's one
to three months stay on a chain gang--for example, coffee, cable TV and other in-
mate frills. Id. Upon his appointment as Alabama's corrections chief, Joe Hopper
declared that he planned to continue to deny these privileges to individually
chained prisoners. Hopper Says He's No Softy, supra note 40, at 5A.
Jones made many comments which supported the assertion that the chain
gangs are meant to make prison stays miserable. For example, he stated that
prisoners "are absolutely complaining and I think the success of the program is
proportionate to their complaints." Alabama Inmates Return to Chain Gangs To-
day, supra note 40, at 2.
124. In Florida, Senator Crist's comments seem sufficiently clear to establish
intent behind the formation of chain gangs. See text accompanying note 80 (noting
the Wilson Court's subjective intent requirement).
125. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (critiquing the cost-saving justi-
fication).
126. See supra note 43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the weak-
nesses of Jones' rationale for chain gangs.
127. Alabama Inmnates Return to Chain Gangs Today, supra note 40, at 2.
128. Schone, supra note 7, at 82.
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Plaintiffs would have to satisfy Estelle's "deliberate indiffer-
ence" standard, adopted in the context of prison conditions cases,
in order to fulfill the subjective component of Eighth Amendment
analysis. 129 The most recent Eighth Amendment case, Farmer v.
Brennan, could once again be used as a model for chain gang
plaintiffs. The Farmer analysis is based entirely on risk. 130 The
Court likened deliberate indifference to reckless disregard of a
substantial risk of serious harm. 131 The Court, however, declined
to define recklessness and instead held that the standard is satis-
fied if an official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to in-
mate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn.., and he must also draw the
inference."132
After Alabama's experience, the risks involved with chain
gangs should be undeniably clear to prison officials in Florida or
any other state. Neither officials implementing chain gangs nor
guards supervising them can reasonably argue that they are un-
aware of the danger involved. As long as the degree of risk can be
successfully established, prison officials' knowledge of and disre-
gard for that risk would likely follow. Unlike Estelle,133 which in-
volved one prisoner's need for medical care, and Farmer,34 which
involved danger to one transsexual prisoner, chain gangs involve
risks created and imposed by state officials on numerous prisoners.
Deliberate indifference would be easier to prove in the chain gang
context than it would be in the case of an individual prisoner.
C. Pushing for Eighth Amendment Evolution: Human
Dignity Deprivation as a Tangible Concept
The images of slavery raised by prisoner chain gangs bring to
mind some of this country's most regrettable acts and policies.
Considering the number of African-American prisoners in the
United States, 135 chain gangs offend human dignity by paying
tribute to such an inhumane practice. No doubt, convict labor in
the post-Civil War era was much more brutal than are today's
129. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
130. 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1984 (1994). See also supra text accompanying note 97.
131. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1978 (1994).
132. Id. at 1979.
133. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
135. As of 1992, African Americans are incarcerated at a rate at least six times
that of whites. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 21, at xiv.
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chain gangs. 136 Nonetheless, analogies are unavoidable and are
certainly justifiable.
Chain gangs are specifically designed to humiliate and de-
grade prisoners. Alabama officials readily admitted that humilia-
tion and degradation were essential components of a chain gang
program, 137 and Florida Senator Crist plans to introduce legisla-
tion with the specific goal of making one's inclusion in chain gangs
more shameful. 138 Degradation is increased by the placement of
chain gangs along heavily traveled highways. 13 9
Although the Supreme Court has not yet construed human
dignity as a tangible concept, the context of chain gangs is de-
grading enough to warrant such an argument. The Wilson Court,
through its use of the deliberate indifference standard, required
the "deprivation of a single, identifiable human need" for the es-
tablishment of a constitutional violation. 140  In the Eighth
Amendment context, human dignity should be classified as a hu-
man need, just as more tangible needs such as health care and nu-
trition.
The Wilson Court's focus on the deprivation of a single hu-
man need as opposed to "overall conditions,"'141 however, weakens
the application of the Eighth Amendment to the chain gang con-
text. The Supreme Court would likely fear giving a phrase as
amorphous as "human dignity" the status of an identifiable, consti-
tutionally protected need such as nutrition or warmth.Trop offers general supportive language in its statement that
"[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man."' 42 Although the concept of having
prisoners perform work is legitimate, chaining them together
solely for reasons of retribution and humiliation sinks to a depth of
inhumanity that the Constitution should not support. The Trop
136. See supra text accompanying note 21.
137. See supra notes 39, 123-124 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
139. One prisoner described the humiliation of chain gang work along the high-
way: "This ain't nothing but a circus, a big old zoo. We all animals now." Leland
& Smith, supra note 7, at 58. See supra note 63 and accompanying text
(discussing Crist's desire to place chain gangs along major highways).
140. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). See supra notes 79-80 and ac-
companying text.
141. Id. at 305. The Court rejected Wilson's theory that "overcrowding, exces-
sive noise, insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, im-
proper ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities
and food preparation, and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates" could
combine to create unconstitutional conditions. Id. at 296.
142. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
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Court charged itself with the "duty of implementing the constitu-
tional safeguards that protect individual rights."'143 It also stated
that the provisions of the Constitution "are vital, living princi-
ples."144 Despite the differences between the facts at issue in Trop
and chain gangs145 the Trop Court's treatment of the Constitution
as a maturing document and its emphasis on protecting individual
rights146 are vital elements for a successful constitutional chal-
lenge to chain gangs.
Although Rhodes offers language in support of contemporary
theories that prison life is supposed to be harsh and unpleasant, 14
7
extending this theory to encompass creative and arbitrary cruelty
such as chain gangs offends human dignity. There are many
prison conditions that may, consistent with the Constitution, be
unpleasant due to building, funding and other limitations. 48
However, given the purpose of the Eighth Amendment as stated in
Trop,149 degrading and meaningless activities that have been arbi-
trarily invented for prisoners should be scrutinized more strictly
than other prison shortcomings that are more natural or acciden-
tal.
The lawsuit brought by Alabama chain gang prisoners was
creative in characterizing dignity as a "fundamental human
need."'150 Potential chain gang prisoners would have an arduous
task in persuading the Supreme Court to take the unprecedented
step of classifying human dignity as a constitutionally protectable
interest. However, the argument, although novel, is supported
both by precedent' 5 1 and modern theories of humane prisoner
treatment.152
143. Id. at 103.
144. Id.
145. Trop involved the de-nationalization of an Army deserter. See supra note
67 and accompanying text.
146. Trop, 356 U.S. at 103.
147. The situation in Chapman may be distinguishable from chain gangs be-
cause of its accidental nature. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-48
(1981). Prison overcrowding may simply be the result of an increase in the prison
population and may lack the deliberative and intentional quality of chain gangs.
148. Id. at 349 ("Mhe Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.").
149. See supra notes 142-146 and accompanying text.
150. Complaint, supra note 5, at 7.
151. See supra notes 140-148 and accompanying text.





While it may be too early to tell what effect prisoner chain
gangs will have on recidivism or whether they will deter crime, 153
they undeniably serve a more immediate and simple purpose: ret-
ribution. Prison policies that cut back on prisoner recreation and
education add to the retributive quality of incarceration. 54 Public
sentiment is dictating development of prison policy, despite argu-
ments that such "get tough" measures are purely symbolic and un-
related to stopping crime. 155
If Florida or another state adopts the practice recently re-
jected in Alabama of chaining inmates together, or if county chain
gang inmates such as those in Tennessee decide to challenge the
practice, the Eighth Amendment provides the most logical battle-
ground. The most recent Eighth Amendment precedent delves
into progressive areas like risk from second-hand smoke and
transsexuals' rights, and considering that the current makeup of
the Court is the same as when Farmer was decided, 156 potential
chain gang plaintiffs may be able to successfully invalidate the
practice via the Eighth Amendment.
The risks inherent in chain gangs provide the strongest evi-
dence to argue that chain gangs are unconstitutional. It is difficult
to imagine a clearer indication of such risks than Abraham
McCord's death in Alabama. If another lawsuit arises, prisoners
could utilize this unfortunate occurrence to their benefit, meshing
the harsh chain gang realities with Supreme Court precedent. The
Court has already accepted risk as an objective harm for Eighth
Amendment purposes. The subjective component of an Eighth
Amendment challenge would present a greater difficulty. How-
ever, the vocality of government and prison officials in responding
to McCord's death provides insight into the intent behind the for-
mation of chain gangs.
Chain gangs are uniquely designed to divest prisoners of
their human dignity. Arguing that human dignity is a tangible
need would be monumental for the Court, but the slave-like prac-
tice of chaining people together for forced labor may be powerful
enough to inspire the Court to classify human dignity as a newly
protectable interest under the Eighth Amendment.
153. See supra note 54 (explaining that evidence indicates that chain gangs are
unlikely to deter crime).
154. See generally Curriden, supra note 123, at 74 (outlining characteristics of
an Alabama chain gang stay).
155. Id.
156. See supra note 92.
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The purely symbolic nature of chain gangs does not translate
well into applied penal policy. Although simplistic "get tough"
policies may make for effective political speech, as applied to pris-
oners, their effectiveness is dubious. One can only hope that
treating prisoners like animals does not turn out to be a self-
fulfilling prophecy.

